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In American Dredging Co., the fact that the complaint did not
specify a federal statute should not have prevented the federal court
32
from acquiring jurisdiction. With a federal question implicit in the
complaint, the fact that the district court would have been unable to
grant injunctive relief and would have dismissed the action should
not have had any bearing on its jurisdiction to retain the case. Lincoln
Mills suggests that a uniform policy in the labor law field regarding
injunctive relief is desirable. If Congress wishes to change this policy
it has the unquestioned authority to do so. Until it acts, state courts
should accept the prohibitions of the Norris-LaGuardia Act and deny
injunctions, or the cases should be readily removable to the federal

district courts.
CHARLES G. JOHNSON

TAX DEPRECIATION DEDUCTIONS IN YEAR OF SALE
One of the most disputed areas of taxation involves the allowance
of a depreciation deduction in the year a depreciable asset is sold at a

price exceeding its adjusted basis. Under the 1954 Code,' depreciation deductions may be taken faster than the actual physical depreciation.2 By selling the asset when total depredation deductions exceed
actual physical depreciation, the taxpayer obtains a substantial tax
savings. The depreciation allowance is taken as a deduction from ordinary income,3 while the increase in gain upon the sale is taxed as
capital gain.4 Thus, ordinary income is converted into capital gain
to the extent of the excessive depreciation deductions. The Commissioner of Internal Revenue attempted to minimize this conversion of
ordinary income into capital gain by disallowing any depreciation
deduction in the year of sale. He also sought a statute expressly declaring all gain from the sale to be ordinary income.
Recently Congress enacted sections 12455 and 12500 of the Internal Revenue Code. Section 1245, to the extent of the depreciation
deductions, prevents any gain received upon the sale of personal prop"Dynamic Mfrs., Inc. v. Local 614, Teamsters Union, io3 F. Supp. 651 (E.D.
Mich. 1952).

"Int. Rev. Code of 1954.
2See Int. Rev. Code of 1954, §§ 167(a)(2), 167(b)( 3 ), 179. These code sections
respectively provide for the use of the declining balance method of depreciation, the
sum of the digits method, and the small business depreciation allowance.
3'nt. Rev. Code of 1954, §§ x6l, 167(a).
4

Int. Rev. Code of 1954 § 1231.

uSection 13 of the Revenue Act of 1962.
6
Section 231 of the Revenue Act of 1964.
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erty from being treated as capital gain. Under section 125 o , a percentage of the gain due to excessive depreciation of realty is taxed
as ordinary income.
Both statutes, however, are limited in their scope of application.
Neither statute affects tax situations prior to 1962;7 both statutes
contain a number of exceptions; section 125o is not concerned with
gain resulting from market appreciation of the asset; and section 125o
is not applicable after a ten-year holding period.8 Because of these
limitations, which still allow substantial conversion of ordinary income into capital gain, the Commissioner will continue to disallow
depreciation deductions in the year of sale, subject to future case developments.&
0 is the first Tax
Macabe Co.O
Court case allowing a depreciation
deduction in the year of sale when the sale price exceeds the asset's adjusted basis."The Macabe Corporation sold a building at a price in excess of its depreciated basis and deducted a depreciation allowance for
the period during the year of sale during which it owned the building. The Commissioner, however, disallowed the deduction and as12
sessed a deficiency.
The Commissioner contended:
1. The building had not depreciated, but actually had appreciated
in value, as shown by the sales proceeds;
2. The salvage value 13 should be equated to the known sales
price;
, :I D
'Section 1245 applies only to deductions taken after December 31, 1961; and
125o applies only
to deductions taken after December 31, 1963.
SUnder § 125 o , only the "applicable percentage" is taxable. "Applicable percentage" is too per cent minus one percentage point for each full month the
property is held after the date on which the property has been held for twenty full
months. On this basis, zero per cent would be taxable after ten years. See §
1250 (a)(2).
"For additional study of §§ 1245, 125o, see H.R. Rep. No. 749, 88th Cong.,
ist Sess. io3 (1963); 16 Major Tax Planning, Recapture of Depreciation under IRC
§1245, 583 (1964); Kahn, Recapture of Depreciation, 42 Taxes 918 (1964); Schapiro,
Recapture of Depredation and § 1245 of the Internal Revenue Code, 72 Yale L.J.
1483 (1963); Comment, 11 U.C.L.A.L. Rev. 593 (1964)2142 T.C. 1io5 (1964). The United States has appealed this case to the Court
of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit. For cases decided after the Macabe case see
infra, note 6o.
"Adjusted basis is the cost of property reduced by depreciation deductions
which have been previously claimed. Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 1o16.
'-See Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 6211.
""Salvage value is the amount (determined at the time of acquisition) which
is estimated will be realizable upon sale or other disposition of an asset when it
is no longer useful in the taxpayer's trade or business or in the production of his
income and is to be retired from service by the taxpayer." Treas. Reg. § 1.167(a)i(c)(i) (1956), as amended (1964).

§
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3. The amount regarded as the salvage value (sale price) plus
prior deductions for depreciation exceeded the original cost of the
4
building;'
4. The taxpayer had fully recovered the adjusted basis which remained in the building at the beginning of the year of sale.
The Tax Court found the estimated useful life 15 was correct, and
that the value of the building had substantially increased from the
time salvage value and useful life had been estimated. 1
Deciding in favor of the Macabe Co., the Tax Court stated that the
Commissioner had failed to distinguish between gain resulting from
excessive depredation deductions17 and gain resulting from value appreciation due to market conditions, and that in equating salvage
value with sales proceeds, the Commissioner had not complied with
the Regulations.' 8 The court held that the increase in the building's
value was due solely to market conditions, and no element of excessive depreciation had been proved. The court concluded that Macabe
had not recovered his adjusted basis in the asset and was entitled,
therefore, to deduct the depredation occurring prior to the transfer,
during the year of sale.
Four judges dissented 19 on the ground that this case was not distinguishable from earlier cases20 which disallowed identical depreciation deductions. The question of whether the Commissioner could prevent the conversion of ordinary income into capital gain by disallowing depreciation deductions in the year of sale was first decided by
"The "reasonable allowance" of the Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 167 is that
amount which should be set aside each year, so that the aggregate of the amounts
set aside, plus salvage value, will equal -the cost of the asset. Treas. Reg. § 1.167(a)
i(a), (1956), as amended (196o). Any depreciation which would cause the total amount
to exceed the cost basis of the asset is not allowable. Treas. Reg. § i.i6 7(b)-o (1956).

""[r]he estimated useful life of an asset is not necessarily the useful life

inherent in the asset but is the period over which the asset may reasonably be
expected to be useful to the taxpayer in his trade or business or in the production

of his income." Treas. Reg. § 1.i67(a)-(b), (1956), as amended (1964).
"Such estimates are necessary in order to arrive at a "reasonable and consistently

applied method of computing depreciation" as required by Treas. Reg. § 1.167(b)-o
(1956). Also see Massey Motors, Inc. v. United States, 364 U.S. 92 (ig6o); Burnet v.
Niagara Brewing Co., 282 U.S. 648 (1935).
"Excessive depreciation means all depreciation deductions that exceed the actual
physical depreciation as determined by the straight-line depreciation rate.
"SSee generally Treas. Reg. § 1.167(a)-(i).
"42 T.C. 1105, 1114 (1964). There are sixteen judges on the Tax Court. A fifth
judge dissented but did not concur in the dissent of the other four.
'Fribourg Nay. Co. v. Commissioner, 335 F.2d 15 (2d Cir. 1964); United States
v. Motorlease Corp., 334 F.2d 617 (2d Cir. 1964). For subsequent history of these
two cases, infra note 38, 44 respectively.
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the Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit in Cohn v. United States.21
This case involved assets which were depreciated over a reasonably
estimated useful life. Salvage value, however, was not estimated by the
taxpayer.
In affirming the judgment of the district court and disallowing the
depreciation deduction in the year of sale when the sale price exceeded the asset's adjusted basis, the court of appeals said:
"But the Government is not contending that salvage value...
should be adjusted at all on account of 'mere fluctuation in
market value.' In so far as this case is concerned the issue is
whether salvage value can be adjusted at or near the end of
the useful life of the asset when it is shown by the actual sale of
the asset that there is a substantial difference between what was
estimated and what it actually is.' '22
The Cohn decision is limited to a factual situation in which there is
an unreasonable estimate of salvage value and the asset is near the
end of its useful life. 23 If the salvage value is unreasonable, it is susceptible to redetermination 24 and could logically be equated to the
sales price because the asset is near the end of its estimated useful
life.2 5 It appears that this case does not establish a rule of law which
would disallow all depreciation deductions in the year of sale whenever the sales price exceeds the asset's adjusted basis. 20
In 1962, Revenue Ruling 62-9227 was issued as a result of the Cohn
decision. The Ruling concluded:
"Therefore, the deduction for depreciation of an asset used in
the trade or business or in the production of income shall be
adjusted in the year of disposition so that the deduction, otherwise properly allowable for such year under the taxpayer's
method of accounting for depreciation, is limited to the
amount, if any, by which the adjusted basis of the property
at the beginning of such year exceeds the amount realized
from sale or exchange." 28
By denying all depreciation deductions in the year of sale when the
sales price is equal to or greater than the asset's adjusted basis,29
'259 F.2d 371 (6th Cir. 1958).

";ld. at 378. (Emphasis added.)
S & A Co. v. United States, 218 F. Supp. 677, 684 (D. Minn. 1963); 9 J. Taxation
141 (1963); Comment, ii U.C.L.A.L. Rev. 593, 61o (1964).
'See Int. Rev. Code of 1954, §§ 167(a), 167 (f).
-S & A Co. v. United States, 218 F. Supp. 677, 684 (D. Minn. 1963). For subsequent history of this case, see infra note 47.
'Merritt, 2o J. Taxation 156, 159 (1964).
"Rev. Rul. 92, 1962-1 Cum. Bull. 29.

2Id. at 31.
nSupra notes 26, 27.
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Revenue Ruling 62-92 disregards the fact that gain may be due solely
to fortuitous market appreciation. 30 Consequently, the Ruling permits the Commissioner to tax such gain at ordinary rates. The fact
that useful life and salvage value were originally estimated correctly
would not make any difference since the Ruling automatically equates
salvage value to sales price. 3 '
While the Cohn decision is limited to a factual situation in which
an unreasonable estimate of salvage value is used, and the asset's estimated useful life is near its end, the Ruling is applicable regardless of a reasonable estimation of salvage value and irrespective of the
asset's remaining useful life. Revenue Ruling 62-92, therefore, has a
much broader effect on the disallowance of depredation deductions in
32
the year of sale than does the Cohn decision.
The Federal Regulations affect the problem of depredation deductions in the year of the sale. Regulation 1.167(a)-1(c) provides that
a reasonably estimated salvage value shall not be redetermined unless there is a significant change in useful life. Thus, the Regulations
prohibit any change in a reasonable estimate of the salvage value of
an asset unless useful life is redetermined. 33 Since the Regulations are
issued by the Commissioner, it is contradictory for him to redetermine
the salvage value (i.e., equate salvage value to sales price) when there
is no dispute as to the taxpayer's estimate of useful life. Of course, any
unreasonable estimate of salvage value is subject to change whether or
not useful life is redetermined. 34 This was true in Cohn, but it does
not apply in Macabe, since reasonable estimates of salvage value were
used.
After the Cohn decision, the Tax Court consistently disallowed all
depreciation deductions in the year of sale when the asset was sold
for more ,than its adjusted basis.3 5
The first important decision following Cohn was Edward v. Lane,3 6
which involved the completed contract method 37 of reporting income.
The Commissioner sought to equate salvage value to sales price. The
8OComment, ii U.C.L.A.L. Rev. 593, 613-14 (1964).
2
3 Supra, note 26; Rabin, 17 J. Taxation 376, 379 (1962).
Supra note 26.
3Treas. Reg., § 1.167(a)-i(c) (1956), as amended (1964).
-"See Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 167(a); see also Cohn v. United States, 259 F.2d
371 (5 th Cir. 1958).
3Ferrari, 20 J. Taxation 308-09 n.i (1964).
-"37 T.C. 188 (i96i .
37Under the completed contract method of income returns, all income and
deductions that arise under a particular contract are deferred until the completion of the contract. Treas. Reg. § 145 1-3 (b)2 (1957).
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Tax Court held that since depreciation deductions were not taken
until the contract ended, it was unnecessary for the taxpayer to make
an original estimate of salvage value; and thus it was only reasonable
to use the sales price as the salvage value. As in Cohn, it appears that
the ruling in Lane is limited to its facts: useful life was at its end and
salvage value had not been estimated prior to the sale.
The first case involving a depreciation deduction in the year of
sale, in which the facts are distinguishable from Cohn, was Fribourg
Nay. Co. 38 Unlike Cohn, both the estimates of useful life and salvage
value were reasonable. In Fribourg, the value of the asset had substantially increased because of fortuitous market conditions,3 9 so that
the asset sold for more than its original cost. The Commissioner disallowed any depreciation deduction in the year of sale. In affirming
the decision of the Tax Court, the Court of Appeals for the Second
Circuit 40 held that the taxpayer had fully recovered his basis in the
asset when he sold .the asset for more than its original basis, since under
Cohn and Revenue Ruling 62-92, the salvage value must be equated
to the sales price. Thus, the court in Fribourgupheld Revenue Ruling
62-92 and did not make any distinction between gain due to excessive
depreciation deductions and gain due to fortuitous market conditions.
Since the Cohn decision, however, the district courts have been
consistent in finding for the taxpayer. 41 Kimball Gas Prod. Co. v.
43
United States42 involved the declining balance depreciation method
under which it is unnecessary to estimate salvage value. The taxpayer
sold its assets for a price in excess of their adjusted basis. The Commissioner disallowed any depreciation deduction in the year of sale,
since the sales price was the actual salvage value. The district court
disagreed and held that since this was the sale of a going concern, the
sales price necessarily included the additional value inherent in the
sale of a going concern. The court concluded that it was incorrect to
equate the salvage value to the sales price, because the gain from the
sale was not due solely to salvage value.
c39 P-H Tax Ct. Mem. 1698 (1962), aff'd, 335 F.2d 15 (2d Cir. 1963), cert.
granted 379 U.S. 998 (1965).
nThe increase in value of the asset, a ship, was due to the Suez crisis, which
subsequently ended as suddenly as it had begun, and the value of the ship dropped
until it was again substantially in line with the estimated figures.
1"Supra note 38.
4'Supra note 35'4CCH 63-2 U.S. Tax Cas.
9507 (W.D. Tex. Dec. 3, 1962).
13rThe declining balance method of depreciation is explained fully in Treas. Reg.
i6 7 (b)-2 (1956), as amended (1964).
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In 1963,a district court in Motorlease Corp. v. United States44 held
the Commissioner could not automatically disallow depreciation deductions simply because the sales price exceeded the asset's adjusted
basis. The court held that, since the estimates of useful life and salvage value were reasonable, and a straight-line depreciation method 45
was used, it was impossible to take excessive depreciation. The court
concluded the gain was due to favorable market conditions, and that
such gain was taxable as capital gain. This case was subsequently reversed in the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit.46
Again in 1963, a district court ruled against the Commissioner
in S & A Co. v. United States, 47 wherein reasonable estimates of useful
life and salvage value had been used. The assets, however, were sold
before ,the end of the estimated useful life at a price in excess of their
adjusted basis. After equating salvage value to sales price, the Commissioner disallowed the depreciation deduction. The court held that
either Revenue Ruling 62-92 only applied to a factual situation similar to the Cohn case or that the Ruling was plainly incorrect. The
court stated that "the sale price received for an asset prior to the
expiration of its useful physical life is no more than a reflection of
the market value of the asset at a particular point in time." 48 Since
the estimated salvage depends on depreciation through the complete
estimated useful life, the sales price could not reasonably be equated
to salvage value before the end of the assets' useful life. Although
the Commissioner did not dispute the estimated useful life, the court
pointed out that a clear necessity for a redetermination of useful life
life must be shown in order to change the estimated salvage value.4 9
Since the sale date was considerably before the end of the estimated
useful life, salvage value would be greater than originally estimated.
This would possibly prevent the sale price from exceeding the remaining readjusted basis. S & A Co. has recently been affirmed by the
Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit.
The diverse approaches of the Tax Court and district courts
to the problem of depreciation deduction in the year of sale result
"215 F. Supp. 356 (D. Conn. 1963), rev'd 334 F.2d 617 (2d Cir. 1964), petition

for cert. filed, CCH 1965 Stand. Fed. Tax Rep. 70,906 (Nov. 13, 1964) (No. 685).
"The straight-line method of depreciation is explained fully in Treas. Reg. §
1.167(b)-i (1956), as amended (196o).
0
" Supra note 44.
4-218 F. Supp. 677 (D. Minn. 1963, aff'd, 338 F.2d 629 (8th Cir. 1964), petition
for cert.
filed, CCH 1965 Stand. F. Tax Rep. 70,907 (Jan. 27, 1965) (No. 862).
48
1d. at 682.
1
49
d.at 682; see Treas. Reg. § 1.167(1)-1(c1(956), as amended (1964).

wOSupra note 47.
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from different concepts regarding the purpose of a depreciation deduction.51
On the one hand, the Tax Court, prior to the Macabe case, appears to have adopted the theory that the purpose of a depreciation
deduction is to compensate a taxpayer for an actual decrease in the
value of the asset. 5 2 Under this theory, salvage value should be equated
to sales price since the actual sales proceeds would determine the
gain or loss in the asset's value. Irrespective of the reasonableness of
estimated useful life and salvage value, gain from both market appreciation and excessive depreciation would affect the allowance of a
depreciation deduction.
On the other hand, the district courts base their concept of a depreciation deduction on the theory that a taxpayer should be allowed
to recover the cost of the asset from ordinary income5 3 Thus, market
appreciation will not affect the allowance of a depreciation deduction,
because it would in no way affect the original cost of the asset.
The reasonableness of the estimated useful life and salvage value
is controlling since excessive depreciation does not exist where estimates of useful life and salvage are reasonable.
The district courts' concept of a depreciation deduction seems to
be more in accord with traditional concepts which allow depreciation
deductions to recover the cost of an asset.54
In the principal case, Macabe Co., the Tax Court held that a rule
of law asserting that no depreciation deductions are allowable in the
year of sale failed to distinguish between gain resulting from excessive depreciation and gain resulting from an appreciation in market
value.n5
nComment, ii U.C.L.A.L. Rev. 593, 613 (1964).
rt2Evidentially this was the theory held by the Tax Court until Macabe, since no
distinction was made between gain due to excessive depreciation and gain due to
market appreciation. Ibid.
nIbid.
"The American Institute of Certified Accountants states: "'The cost of productive facility is one of the costs of the services it renders during its useful economic life. Generally accepted accounting principles require that this cost be spread
over the expected useful life of the facility in such a way as to allocate it as equitably
as possible to the periods during which services are obtained from the use of the
facility.... It [depreciation accounting] is a process of allocation, not of valuation.'"
Comment, ii U.S.L.A.L. Rev. 593, 612 at n.i65 (1964). See United States v. Ludey,
274 U.S. 295 (1927).
-Market appreciation of the assets value will obviously increase the gain received
upon the sale of the object. Depreciation, however, through exhaustion will only increase the gain at sale when it is excessive (i.e., when an asset is depreciated faster
than actual depreciation). The increased gain comes from the difference between the
sales price and the lower adjusted basis.
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Gain from excessive depreciation is a result of the concept of depreciation through exhaustion which permits the recovery of investment cost in a depreciable asset by allowing a deduction against ordinary income.5 6 This depreciation of investment cost occurs through
use and time, irrespective of market conditions which may increase
or decrease the asset's value. 57 The Macabe case points out that Section 167 of the Internal Revenue Code, which allows deductions for
depreciation due to exhaustion, distinguishes gain resulting from
depreciation by exhaustion from gain due to appreciation in market
value. The Section states: "When an asset is retired by sale at arm's
length, recognition of gain or loss will be subject to the provisions of
sections loo2, and 1231, and other applicable provisions of the law."
The court in Macabe distinguished the Fribourg decision, in
which a depreciation deduction was disallowed although market appreciation was apparent, on the ground that "there is no indication...
that the taxpayer carried its borden of proof as to the amount of gain
due to market appreciation as contrasted with gain due to the claiming of excess depreciation."5 8 Since Macabe held that a depreciation
deduction is disallowable only when gain is due to excessive depredation, proof of a certain amount of gain due to market appreciation,
or excessive depreciation, will be the controlling factor.59
It is submitted that the Cohn principle has been unreasonably
extended by the courts in two respects. Firstly, numerous cases, which
have relied on Cohn, have involved entirely different facts. Secondly,
the decision has been extended by being interpreted as a rule of law
that a depreciation deduction is automaticaly disallowed in the year
of the sale when the sales price exceeds the asset's adjusted basis. As a
result of these extensions, market appreciation, realized upon the disposition of the asset, is treated as reducing the adjusted basis of the
asset, thus preventing the Code's intended depreciation deduction
against ordinary income.
The Macabe decision, which places the burden of proof of market
appreciation on the taxpayer, appears to solve the Commissioner's
problem of excessive depredation with the resulting conversion of or14Macabe Co., 42 T.C. iio, iio7 (1964); See Detroit Edison Co. v. Commission,
319 U.S. 98, 101 (1943); United States v. Ludey, 274 U.S. 295, 301 (1927).
',Treas. Reg. § i.167(a)-i(a).
r'Macabe Co., 42 T.C. sso 5 , iio8 (1964).
51See Nichols, 43 T.C. 14 (1964).

